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THEOCENTRIC 
CHRISTOLOGY 
BY PAUL F. KNITTER 
"Many Christian theologians have moved resolutely 
away from an exclusive Christology. Today Chris-
tology has become (or rebecome) inclusive,... The 
theocentric, non-normative understanding of Christ, 
proposed by the theologians we have studied, will be 
experienced by many Christians as a threat to the 
validity of their faith. Therefore, in exploring the 
possibility of the theocentric approach to Christ, 
theological caution and especially pastoral sensitiv-
ity are necessary. " 
IN PETER SCHINELLER'S well-known survey of contemporary views of the uniqueness of Christ and the church, as well as in Lucien Richard's more recent review of the same issue, it is clear 
that many Christian theologians have moved resolutely away from an 
exclusive Christology. Today Christology has become (or rebecome) 
inclusive. In unpacking what such inclusivity contains, both of the 
mentioned studies indicate the breadth, as well as the limits, of 
contemporary attitudes toward Christ and toward the world outside of 
Christianity. 
Inclusive Christologies tend to affirm a "theocentric universe," one in 
which God, with divine revelation and salvation, can be present beyond 
Jesus Christ, within all world religions. That's the breadth. But these 
Christologies, in different forms, still insist on the "normativity" of 
Jesus. That's the limit. Jesus constitutes the final, the definitive, the full 
and therefore the normative revelation of God. He is the "norma 
normans non normata, " the norm beyond all norms. All other revela-
tions and religions, rich and salvine as they may be, do not share this 
conclusiveness; they must be completed and "normed" by Jesus. 
To move beyond such a normative Christology, the current consensus 
holds, would be either to abandon or to dilute an essential ingredient in 
Christian experience and tradition. Tom Driver, who, as we shall see, is 
making such a move, feels he is alone; he finds that even well known 
liberal theologians (such as Langdon Gilkey, Van Harvey, John Cobb, 
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David Tracy), who are eloquently sensitive to historical relativity and 
religious pluralism, still put "Christ at the center of things" (Driver, 73). 
Schineller also points out that while a "non-normative Christology" 
offers "an attractive position," it "seems somewhat ineffective in an age 
of pluralism since it affirms that we cannot make decisions among 
religions and religious savior figures" (Schineller, 565). 
A growing number of Christian theologians are clearly and seriously 
questioning the finality or definitive normativity of Christ and Chris-
tianity. Most of them are doing so out of the practical experience of 
dialogue with other religions. All are suggesting a revision of Christian 
attitudes that will preserve the distinctiveness of Christ and at the same 
time allow for a more open and authentic interreligious dialogue. They 
feel they can admit relativity without sinking into relativism. 
Such efforts, admittedly, still make up a minority voice in the 
Christian churches. To assess what this voice is saying and why its 
volume seems to be increasing, let us examine three of its principal 
spokespersons. Each of them has roots in a different Christian tradition: 
John Hick, originally an evangelical Christian; Raimundo Panikkar, a 
Roman Catholic priest; Stanley Samartha of the Church of South India. 
We will call on two other voices critical of a normative Christology: 
theologians involved in the Jewish-Christian dialogue and representative 
political/liberation theologians. 
I 
While there is an underlying agreement among all these critical views 
of Jesus' uniqueness, each of them uses a particular perspective in 
attempting to revise the traditional understanding of Christ's normativ-
ity and finality. I will try to bring these individual perspectives into clear 
focus and indicate, at the end of each section, other contemporary 
theologians who are using the same perspective. My intent is to show 
that this minority view is not as minor as one might think. 
(1) It was an encounter, both theoretical and personal, with other 
faiths, that brought about a "Copernican revolution" in John Hick's 
evangelical Christian faith. Since 1973, he has been promoting a similar 
revolution for Christianity at large. Its content and intent can be 
succinctly summarized. Like Copernicus' model of the universe, it 
involves an equally radical transformation in our conception of the universe of 
faiths and the place of our own religion within i t . . . [It demands] a paradigm 
shift from a Christianity-centered or Jesus-centered to a God-centered model 
of the universe of faiths. One then sees the great world religions as different 
human responses to the one divine Reality, embodying different perceptions 
which have been formed in different historical and cultural circumstances 
(Hick, 1973: 131; 1980b: 5-6). 
Hick clearly recognizes that "this paradigm shift involves a reopening 
of the Christological question" (1980b: 6). Admitting that "this must be 
the most difficult of all issues for a Christian theology of religions" 
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(1973:148), he works out a solution that allows Christians to continue to 
adhere to Christ as their unique savior without having to insist that he is 
necessarily unique or normative for others. Hick's main device for doing 
this, and his main contribution to a theocentric, non-normative Chris-
tology is his insistence that Christian belief in the incarnation and in the 
divinity of Jesus is mythic and therefore not only allows but demands 
reinterpretation. 
Talk about Jesus as the Incarnation of the Word and as the Son of 
God was, Hick tells us, one of the many symbolic-mythic models used by 
the early Jesus-followers to try to express what he meant for them. This 
mythic interpretation turned out to be "the essential Christian belief," 
the hallmark of Christian identity. Hick insists, however, that it was not 
so in the very beginning. He makes much of the "all but certain" 
consensus of biblical scholars that Jesus did not designate himself 
Messiah or the Son of God, nor accept any such confession about himself 
from others (1980a: 184; 1973: 113-114). Tracing the development of 
the myth of incarnation, Hick finds its embryonic form in the Jewish 
model of "Son of God," a title often used for the Messiah which, 
however, could be applied to any extraordinary religious person; it 
indicated uniqueness, but not exclusivity. 
As the early community moved into the Greco-Roman culture, the 
image of the Son of God was tightened into the notion of incarnation and 
unique deification. "Ideas of divinity embodied in human life [were] . . . 
widespread in the ancient world . . . so that there is nothing in the least 
surprising in the deification of Jesus in that cultural environment" 
(1977: 174). This deification process is evident already in the Gospel of 
John, but it was especially in the conciliar debates of the ensuing 
centuries, which drew heavily on Greek philosophical concepts and 
worldview, that the mythical images of "son of God" and "incarnation" 
were ontologized into absolute and exclusive categories. Thus took place 
"the very significant transition from 'Son of God' to 'God the Son,' the 
Second Person of the Trinity." Hick does not at all consider this process 
a falsification of the Christian experience. It was natural that the early 
community try to express its experience of Jesus "in the language of 
absolutes." Jesus as the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, was 
"an effective way, within that cultural milieu, of expressing Jesus' 
significance as the one through whom men had transformingly encoun-
tered God" (1977: 172,175-176; 1973: 116). 
But the myth of the incarnation is not so effective today. One of the 
chief problems with it is that, when taken literally, it leads to all the 
uncomfortable "onlys" in Christian self-consciousness: Christ is the 
"only Savior" or the "only final norm" for all other religions. So Hick 
urges not that belief in the incarnation be done away with (as some of his 
critics have accused), but that it be taken as a myth, that is, not literally 
but seriously. He finds precedent for his hope that this will take place. 
"Christianity will... outgrow its theological fundamentalism, its literal 
interpretation of the idea of the incarnation as it has largely outgrown its 
biblical fundamentalism" (1977: 179-180, 183-184). 
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In the way Hick explains his interpretation of the meaning of the 
myth of the incarnation, he often exposes himself to ready misunder-
standing and criticism. He states that language about Jesus as the 
incarnate Son of God is not meant to be a "factual statement" about 
"empirical, metaphysical" realities. The imagery of incarnation "lacks 
any non-metaphorical meaning." "The real point and value of the 
incarnation doctrine is not indicative but expressive, not to assert a 
metaphysical fact but to express a valuation and evoke an attitude" 
(1977: 177-178; 1968: 32). 
But Hick does not mean that the myth of the incarnation expresses 
only an attitude, only a personal response, as if there were no reality 
outside of the attitude. In more technical terms, he is not denying that 
there are any "cognitive claims" to the myth of the incarnation. He is 
not reducing the traditional ontological Christology to a functional 
Christology. For him, there Mt facts that constitute the content and the 
cause of the myth. If people began to talk about God incarnate in Jesus, 
it was because they experienced him to be "so powerfully God-conscious 
that his life vibrated, as it were, to the divine l ife; . . . he was so totally 
conscious of God that . . . [others] could catch something of the 
consciousness by spiritual contagion.... He was a soul liberated from 
selfhood and fully open to the divine Spirit." Although Hick believes 
that Jesus grew into this consciousness, that it was not given him 
pre-packaged from above, still Hick is making the "factual statement" 
that this is what Jesus was (1977: 172, 1973: 114-116). Incarnation-
language refers not just to something that happens in us, but to 
something that happened in Jesus. 
Even though Hick holds that "metaphysical facts" are not the "main 
point" of the incarnation, he does offer his own metaphysical commen-
tary on what the myth means. Trying to move beyond the Chalcedonian 
categories drawn from an Hellenic metaphysics of substance, he views 
the divine nature not as a quantity of substantial stuff, but as an activity 
carrying out a purpose. If, as Christianity has always held, this activity 
is Agape ("God is love"—I John 4:8), and if this love is at work in 
history "from the inside," then someone described as the incarnation of 
God would be a clear case of the "inhistorisation" of the Divine Agape. 
There would be a "numerical identity" between God's Agape and Jesus. 
"Jesus' Agape is not a representation of God's Agape; it is that Agape 
operating in a finite mode; it is the eternal divine Agape made flesh, 
inhistorised" (1973: 148-158). 
With such a metaphysics of the incarnation, Hick feels, room is left 
for other religions and other saviors. He explains that if we understand 
the incarnation "as a temporal cross-section of God's Agapeing," it is 
"not the entirety of that of which it is a cross-section." Or, more clearly, 
"We want to say of Jesus that he was totus deus, 'wholly God,' in the 
sense that his Agape was genuinely the Agape of God at work on earth, 
but not that he was totum dei, 'the whole of God,' in the sense that the 
divine Agape was expressed without remainder in each or even in some 
of his actions" (1973: 159). 
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So, according to Hick, by understanding the incarnation as a myth, 
Christians can declare that God is truly to be encountered in Jesus, but 
not only in Jesus. Furthermore, they can announce that Jesus is the 
center and norm for their lives, without having to insist that he be so for 
all other human beings. Such a Christology lays the foundation not only 
for the possibility but the necessity of interreligious dialogue. 
Examples of other theologians who make use of Hick's perspective, 
that is, the mythic language of the incarnation, as a means for working 
toward an interreligious dialogue based on a non-normative Christology 
are Monika Hellwig (we will hear more from her in the following 
section) and John A. T. Robinson who, like Hick, interprets the "word 
pictures" of the incarnation to mean that Jesus was "totus deus, the one 
who is utterly expressive of Godhead," not "totum dei, the exhaustive 
revelation" of God (Robinson, 1979: 104, 120).1 
(2) Raimundo Panikkar is one of the most profound and eloquent, as 
well as one of the most experienced, advocates of a new Christian 
attitude toward other religions and of a new Christology which would be 
consistent with that attitude. As the son of a Spanish Roman Catholic 
mother and an Indian Hindu father, he grew up in two religious 
traditions. His life of faith and scholarship has continued to be nurtured 
by both traditions. 
For the last two and a half decades, Panikkar has urged what he calls 
"an ecumenical ecumenism." Like Christian ecumenism, it seeks to 
promote among all world religions an ever greater "unity without 
harming diversity." Similar to what Christian ecumenism recognizes 
among the churches, this interreligious dialogue recognizes among all 
the world religions a common source and sustenance (Panikkar terms it 
"the fundamental religious fact"), which exists and can be recognized, 
however, only in the diversity of the religions. Paradoxically, religious 
unity, for Panikkar, can be promoted only if the differences among the 
religions are respected. Still, such unity and cooperation among religions 
is impossible if any one religion professes to have the "monopoly" on the 
fundamental religious fact. In other words, if the dialogue is to work, no 
religion can enter it claiming a final or unique normativity for all other 
religions (Panikkar, 1973a: 115, 131; 1974; 517; 1978: 2-23; 1981: 19, 
23-24). 
Robinson points out the dangers of relativism he finds in Hick's approach to other 
religions; and in no way does he wish to jettison the doctrine of the incarnation as, he 
thinks, Hick and other contributors to the Myth Of God Incarnate seem to. Still, with 
Hick, he interprets the mythic language of the incarnation to mean not that Jesus is "of 
one substance" (Homoousios) but "of one love" (Homoagape) with the Father (1979: 
102, 116-117, 119-121). While Robinson is staunchly opposed to "an absolutist, 
exclusivist or triumphalist assertion of the uniqueness of Jesus as the Christ," he makes the 
"humble confession" that for him Jesus of Nazareth incarnates and expresses the divine 
Agape "more fully than . . . any other such focal figure." But he insists that this is a 
personal confession, not a metaphysical declaration. It, like Christ himself, bears an 
inescapable "provisionality." The Christian's personal confession that Jesus is the clearest 
focus of God's love is "always to be clarified, completed, and corrected in dialogue" (1979: 
125-129; 1973: Chapter 7). 
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Especially in his more recent statements, Panikkar has recognized 
that this ecumenical ecumenism places painful strains on present-day 
Christological benefits. Our new age of religious pluralism demands "an 
authentically universal Christology." Panikkar's distinctive contribu-
tion to such a universal, theocentric, and non-normative Christology is 
grounded on his distinction between the universal Christ and the 
particular Jesus. Panikkar's notion of the universal Christ, as distin-
guished from Jesus, preserves, he feels, the substance of the traditional 
Logos or Wisdom theology and illumines it by today's cross-cultural 
religious experience (1973a: 127). 
"Christ i s . . . a living symbol for the totality of reality: human, divine, 
cosmic" (1981: 27). This totality of reality is what he calls the 
"primordial theandric fact," or more recently, the "cosmotheandric 
reality." These terms try to express "that intimate and complete 
unity . . . between the divine and the human." Panikkar explicitly calls 
this unity a "non-dualist vision." God and the finite world make up a 
unity, not monistic, but neither dualistic (1973a: 115-116; 1973b: 71, 
74; 1981: 27). 
Man and God are neither two nor one . . . There are not two realities: God and 
man (plus world); but neither is there one: God or man . . . Reality itself is 
theandric... God and man are, so to speak, in close constitutive collaboration 
for the building up of reality, the unfolding of history and the continuation of 
creation . . . God, man, and the world are engaged in a unique adventure and 
this engagement constitutes true reality . . . theandrism is in a paradoxical 
fashion (for one can speak in no other way) the infinitude of man . . . and the 
finitudeof God (1973b: 74-75). 
Christ, for Panikkar, is both symbol and substance of this dynamic 
non-dualistic unity between God, humanity, and world. Christ, there-
fore, is synonymous with "God the Son, the Logos." The Christ as the 
Logos is the external expression, the creative communication of the 
Ultimate, "whatever God does ad extra" (1981: 169). Panikkar piles up 
traditional imges to try to express the breadth and the intimacy of this 
divine activity. Christ is "that from which the World comes forth, the 
Alpha and Omega . . . the historical action of divine providence that 
inspires Mankind in different ways according to time and place, and 
directs human life . . . towards its fullness...." There is, then, only one 
Christ, "only one link, one mediator between God and the rest, between 
the one and the many.. . . Between these two poles everything that 
functions as mediator, link, 'conveyer' is Christ." This Christ is both 
divine and human, "really 'human,' or rather worldly without ceasing to 
be divine . . . a reality which not only connects the two poles, but which 
'is' the two poles without permitting them to coalesce." The Christ, 
therefore, is the ground of divinity within all humanity; "the 'vocation' 
that summoned man into being destined him from the very beginning to 
be the Son of God, one with the only Son" (1981: 48-49, 155-159, 165, 
169; 1973b: 53, 73). 
Panikkar's notion of the universal Christ forces questions about the 
historical Jesus. What is the relation between the two? At this point 
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Panikkar reveals where he agrees with and where he steps beyond most 
current Christological models. With theologians like Rahner and Cobb, 
he affirms that the Logos or Christ, eternal and universal, has been 
incarnated in Jesus of Nazareth. But he parts company with them in 
refusing to maintain that such an incarnation has taken place solely, 
finally, definitively, normatively in Jesus. This refusal signals a clear 
change in his own views. In the first edition of his Hidden Christ (1964), 
Panikkar still held that "a full Christian faith is required to accept. . . 
[the] identity" between Christ and "Jesus the Son of Mary." This made 
Christianity "the place where Christ is fully revealed, the end and 
plentitude of every religion" (1964: 145; 1973b: 55). Since the early 
'70s, however, he has silenced such talk of "identity" and "plentitude," 
and rejected all models of encounter between Christianity and other 
religions that presume, from the outset, the fulfillment of other religions 
in Christianity (1981: 75-96).2 
Panikkar now states clearly that no historical name or form can be the 
full, final expression of the Christ. "As the universal symbol for 
salvation [Christ] cannot be objectified and thus reified as a merely 
historical personage." This means that "Christ the Savior i s . . . not to be 
restricted to the merely historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth." "Though 
a Christian believes that 'Jesus is the Christ' this sentence is not 
identical to 'The Christ is Jesus." Jesus, therefore, is a concrete 
historical name for the "Supername," that is, the Christ, which is always 
"the name above every name" (Phil. 2:9); (1972: 52-62; 1973b: 53; 
1981:14,27). 
In admitting the limitations of the historical Jesus, Panikkar in no 
way intends to downplay his necessity—or the necessary role of particu-
lar mediators in all religions. The universal Christ, the cosmotheandric 
fact, can become real only through some particular, historical form; it 
must take on a concrete name. For himself, as for all Christians, he 
recognizes that Jesus is the ultimate form of Christ: "this Lord [Christ] 
whose Lordship can appear in innumerable forms has taken for me an 
ultimate form which is indissolubly connected with Jesus of Nazareth" 
(1972: 64; 1981: 7). 
Panikkar is convinced, however, that a Christian can make such a 
personal confession and at the same time acknowledge that "all religions 
recognize in one way or another" this Christ. The name above all names, 
that is, the Christ, can go by many historical names: Rama, Krishna, 
Isvara, Purusha, Tathagata (1973b: 53-54; 1981: 27, 48). "Jesus . . . 
would be one of the names of the cosmotheandric principle, which has 
2This turning point in Panikkar's thought is found especially in "The Category of 
Growth" (1973a), Salvation In Christ (1972) and in the completely revised edition of the 
Unknown Christ (1981). Panikkar states that he would have liked to be "much more 
radicar' in this new edition but, for the sake of continuity and "the rhythm of history," 
held back (30). 
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received practically as many names as there are authentic forms of 
religiousness and which at the same time finds an historically sui generis 
[special] epiphany in Jesus of Nazareth" (1972: 71-72). 
A number of other contemporary theologians, in their efforts to 
elaborate a non-normative Christology, make distinctions similar to the 
one Panikkar draws between the universal Logos or Christ and the 
historical Jesus, such as Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who urges Christians 
to use the adverb "really" rather than "fully" when they speak of God 
being revealed in Jesus (175); Don Cupitt, who explicitly holds that 
while there is surely only "one Jesus," there can be "many Christs" 
(1972,1975); John Macquarrie, who proposes a model for interreligious 
dialogue based on "commitment and openness"—total commitment to 
Jesus and radical openness to other revelations beyond Jesus (1979); 
Thor Hall who calls upon Christians to relativize the particularity of the 
incarnation [Jesus] and to universalize the principle of incarnation 
[Christ], and therefore to "consider the Christ-principle capable of 
self-realization in a plurality of Christ-events" (124-125).3 
(3) Stanley J. Samartha speaks out of a long history of ecumenism, 
both Christian and interreligious. An Indian by birth, presbyter of the 
Church of South India, he served as Director of the World Council of 
Churches' Program on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and 
Ideologies from 1968-1980. Throughout his life, Samartha has advo-
cated dialogue among world religions as the demand of our age. As to 
the theological grounds for this dialogue, it is often difficult to pinpoint 
his own opinions, especially in his earlier writings, most of which report 
the views of the WCC. He seems to have endorsed the theological 
framework of the WCC approach to other faiths during the '50s and 
'60s. This was a "cosmic Christology," which saw the saving light of 
Christ shining within all religions but emanating, fully and normatively, 
from the historical Jesus (1974). In his more recent statements, during 
the last half of the 1970s, Samartha seems to have changed his tone. It is 
much the same change of tone we noted in Panikkar. Samartha is now 
3For Don Cupitt, the notion of the finality and absoluteness of Christ is a discardable 
element in the mythic model with which Jesus was first understood, part of the 
"eschatological scheme . . . a view of time peculiar to the Jews." In his own reinterpreta-
tion of Christ, Cupitt explicitly adopts a Logos Model. Instead of a Christology of Jesus as 
the final, only begotten Son of God, he proposes a Christology of Jesus as the Word of God. 
With such a model, Jesus is final not in himself but "because of the way he bears witness to 
what is final and unsurpassable." Cupitt urges "that talk of Christ must either break away 
from an exclusive association with Jesus of Nazareth or he severely pruned back" (1975: 
618-622,626-627; 1972: 137-139). 
John Macquarrie, especially in his earlier writings, holds that for Christians to claim 
that their "particular revelation . . . is the touchstone and norm by which all other 
revelations whatsoever must be judged" is "not only morally but intellectually objection-
able . . . The notion of a normative revelation must be rejected" (1964: 39, 44). While, in 
more recent statements, Macquarrie calls Jesus "the definitive focus of God's acting and 
presence in the world" (i.e., the Logos) it is clear that he intends this "definitiveness" to 
describe the quality of Christian commitment to Christ (1979: 347-355). 
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suspicious of all Christian approaches to other religions based on a 
theory of anonymous Christianity or cosmic Christology (1981: 35). 
Like Panikkar, Samartha has come to question the absolute finality 
and universal normativity of Christ. His guiding argument for doing so, 
and his distinctive contribution to a non-normative Christology, is his 
insistence that in light of God as total Mystery, as absolute Other, no 
religious figure or religion can call itself the final and full word. "The 
Other relativizes everything else. In fact, the willingness to accept such 
relativization is probably the only real guarantee that one has encoun-
tered the Other as ultimately real." So Samartha urges a model for 
interreligious encounter that will "recognize God alone as Absolute 
and. . . [will] consider all religions to be relative" (1982:151-152; 1981: 
20-30). 
In relativizing all particular religious figures and revelations, Samar-
tha, again like Panikkar, does not intend to deny their necessity or to 
reduce them to a common denominator. The Mysterious Other must 
confront us through particular mediations. Samartha clearly rejects any 
model for dialogue which argues that "all particularities [are] equally 
valid" and which demands "that no particularity should claim universal-
ity" (1981: 29). Still, while each particular revelation is genuinely 
different, while each may claim a relevance for other religions, each 
religion and each divine revealer remains limited. "A particular religion 
can claim to be decisive for some people, and some people can claim that 
a particular religion is decisive for them, but no religion is justified in 
claiming that it is decisive for all" (1982: 153). Samartha warns 
explicitly that no religion, including Christianity, can claim "finality" 
(1981:36). 
Samartha warns against a "Christomonism" which has infected 
Christian doctrine and which so absolutizes Jesus that it turns him into 
"a kind of cult figure over against other religious figures." Christians 
must never forget that "in the incarnation God relativizes himself." 
Instead of a Christomonistic approach to other religions, Samartha 
advocates a theocentric approach, which, he holds, will be more faithful 
to the original message of Jesus himself (1981: 27). 
With such a theocentric model for understanding and encountering 
other religions, based on a non-normative Christology, Christians, 
Samartha concludes, will still be able to hold to their personal commit-
ment to Christ and to their belief in his universal meaning. They will still 
be able to tell other religions that/or them, for Christians "nowhere else 
is the victory over suffering and death manifested so decisively as in the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ." But such an announcement will 
be an enthusiastic witness to their own revealer, not a denigrating 
judgment about other revealers. While Christians continue to carry out 
what they feel is their universal mission of witnessing to Christ, they will 
be able to "recognize that their neighbors too have their 'missions' in the 
same pluralistic world" (1981: 30, 33-34, 36). 
Samartha's recognition of the necessary relativity of all religions and 
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religious figures before the Mystery of God is a perspective that can be 
found in most contemporary theologians who are working toward a less 
Christocentric approach to other religions. Among those who make 
particular use of this perspective are: Howard Burkle, who insists that 
we must approach other religions well aware of "the inescapable 
relativity of all human consciousness" and the inescapable relativization 
of the Absolute in the incarnation; Donald Da we and Langdon Gilkey, 
who find an essential relativity or limitation in all of God's convenants 
with humankind.4 
II 
The contemporary dialogue between Christianity and its parent 
religion, Judaism, contains some of the hardest criticisms of traditional 
normative Christology. This dialogue is growing, and so is its literature. 
What follows is only a selective review, with a focus on the Christologi-
cal question. 
Christian participants in the dialogue with Judaism are stirred by the 
same problem that bothers their colleagues in the dialogue with 
Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam: the way Christianity's traditional self-
understanding either writes off or subordinates the value of Judaism. 
From their own experience of dialogue with Jews as well as from their 
own experience of what faith in Christ means, these theologians feel 
there is definitely something wrong with the "supersessionist" approach 
to Judaism. All of these theologians are convinced that such a model of 
Christian-Jewish encounter cannot be discarded "unless the church is 
ready to significantly rethink its traditional interpretations of Christol-
ogy." More explicitly, they have come to "the conclusion that part of our 
traditional Christology is severely inadequate and should be perhaps 
discarded" (Pawlikowski, 1982: 7; id., 1977: 367-368). 
Although these theologians take different approaches to this "pro-
found re-evaluation" of traditional Christology ("Single-Covenant" or 
"Double-Covenant" perspectives) (Pawlikowski, 1982: 8-35; McGarry: 
73-98), there is almost unanimous agreement among them that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for Christians to continue talking about Jesus 
as the final Messiah, that is, as he who has brought the Messianic 
Kingdom and who therefore has realized God's final, definitive salvation 
for all history. Chastened by the dialogue with their Jewish brothers and 
sisters, these Christian theologians have come to recognize that accord-
ing to the Messianic promises, which Jesus is supposed to have fulfilled, 
the true Messiah cannot be considered only as a perfected individual; he 
must also bring about a kingdom. And here is where the "facts of 
history" do not seem to sustain the Christian claim. "Our two thousand 
4Burkle's article is one of the most coherent contemporary statements of how Christians 
might recognize the relativity of Jesus and all religious figures without necessarily denying 
their "decisiveness" and universal relevance (459-460,462,464). Da we and Gilkey would 
agree (Dawe: 13-33; Gilkey: 139-144). Gilkey, however, is not at all clear as to how far 
one can go in applying radical relativity to Jesus (see 157-170). 
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years of human experience" do not allow Christians to maintain that 
Jesus is the Messiah, the final savior, who has brought about the 
Kingdom. Christians "can no longer simply claim that the Jewish notion 
of the Messianic age was realized in the Death-Resurrection of Christ" 
(Pawlikowski, 1977: 376; Ruether, 1981: 43). Honest dialogue with 
Jews has forced Monika Hellwig and Rosemary Ruether to admit that 
in a real sense, Jesus is not yet the Messiah or the Christ. To proclaim 
that "Jesus is Lord" designates not a. fait accompli but a task yet to be 
accomplished (Ruether, 1972: 22; Hellwig: 49). That rules out any 
finality or absolute normativity for Jesus. 
Most of the authors we have mentioned would follow Ruether's 
reading of how Christians came to fashion Jesus into an absolute and 
exclusive savior. In the very beginning, the first Jesus followers (most of 
them Jews) understood Jesus as he, most likely, understood himself, that 
is, in a very Jewish, a very eschatological sense. He was a prophet who 
played a crucial role in proclaiming and bringing about God's future 
kingdom in the world. But the kingdom did not come. When the early 
Christians set about trying to understand what this meant for them and 
for their understanding of Jesus, they transformed the future into the 
present. The future kingdom was claimed to have been already realized 
in the history of Jesus, and this historical realization was understood to 
be carried on in the church. Thus, an exclusive finality was attributed to 
Jesus and, by extension, to the church. Christ and Christ's church were 
seen as the only way to God. This, according to Ruether, paved the way 
for the anti-Semitism, as well as the anti-Buddhism, etc., which was to 
infect the Christian churches through the centuries (Ruether, 1974: 
64-182; id.: 1968). 
None of the Christian theologians involved in the dialogue with Jews 
has worked out a fully developed Christology which would avoid the 
exclusivism of making Jesus the final Messiah but which would main-
tain his saving role in preparing for the eschatological future. Some of 
them, however, offer suggestions and guidelines for such a Christology. 
Ruether summarizes her own suggestions: "the messianic meaning of 
Jesus' life . . . is paradigmatic and proleptic in nature, not final and 
fulfilled" (1974:249). Jesus, in what he was and in what he symbolizes, 
is the "paradigm of hope" for Christians. Keeping alive the memory of 
his resurrection from the dead, his followers have a basis for their refusal 
to take evil as the last word and for their hope that God will win in the 
end. Jesus therefore does not attain a finality that can be captured 
within history; rather, he points to a finality which is still ahead and 
toward which we must still work. Ruether recognizes that other para-
digms, like that of the Exodus, can carry out this same function (1974: 
256; id., 1972: 22; id., 1981: 42-43). 
Monika Hellwig, reflecting the approach of John Hick, suggests that 
a reinterpretation of traditional Christology might well begin with a 
recognition of the nature of the language used by the early Christians to 
speak about the divinity and the uniqueness of Jesus. It is "religious 
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language," mythic, poetic, used to express "the unknowns in Christian 
experience of divine intervention." Such language will always remain 
"elusive" and should not be pinned down to absolute, ontological 
statements. Hellwig suggests that such language be interpreted phenom-
enologically, that is, as expressing how Jesus was for Christians their 
place of radical encounter with God (49). 
John Pawlikowski agrees with the general direction of Ruether's and 
Hellwig's suggestions, but he is more concerned about maintaining some 
form of uniqueness for Jesus. He locates this uniqueness in the fact that 
in Jesus the pre-established unity between God and humankind came to 
"full awareness." Jesus therefore is "crucial" for spreading this aware-
ness among all nations. No other human being "will ever share the same 
intimacy with the divine nature that existed in the person of Jesus" 
(1982:114-115). Yet Pawlikowski goes on to show, at great length, how 
belief in the incarnational unity between God and humanity was 
seminally but truly contained in the Pharisaical revolution that was 
transforming Judaism at the time of Jesus; in many ways, Jesus was part 
of and continued this revolution (1982: 116-118, 76-107). Pawlikowski 
also concludes that the "unique" revelation of God in Jesus "is in 
principle no greater than the sacred acts through which Israel was 
originally elected." "The revelation at Sinai stands on equal footing with 
the revelation in Jesus" (1982: 122). What Pawlikowski is saying 
reflects the general view of most of the authors we have reviewed: if 
there is something unique or "normative" in Christ that Judaism needs, 
there is also something unique and normative in Judaism needed by 
Christianity (Pawlikowski, 1982: 149, 122-123; id., 1977: 385-387; 
Ruether, 1981:38-39). 
HI 
Another clear, even shrill, call for a thorough revision of the 
traditional understanding of Christ as normative and final comes from 
the perspective of liberation and political theology, as that perspective is 
being employed by First World theologians like Dorothée Soelle, 
Rosemary Ruether, and especially Tom Driver. Their contribution to 
the development of a non-normative Christology is mainly methodologi-
cal. In a sense they uncover the method, or an essential element in the 
method, that is operative in all the proposed revisions of Christology that 
have been studied so far. 
Latin American liberation theologians, as is well known, have devel-
oped a praxis-based method for theology, but they have not applied this 
method to the traditional doctrines of Christ's uniqueness and finality. 
Tom Driver and Rosemary Ruether have. It amounts to what might be 
called an "ethical hermeneutics." It means, simply, that we must judge 
the truth of any Christological statement by its ethical fruits, that is, by 
the praxis to which it leads. Stated negatively, if a particular belief in 
Christ either causes or sanctions a Christian practice which, from basic 
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Christian standards, would be unethical, something is wrong with that 
belief (Driver: 22-23; Ruether, 1981: 4). 
On the basis of such a method, the ethical report card of traditional 
Christology is not something one would want to bring home to a God of 
love and justice. Driver and Ruether maintain that the image of Jesus 
Christ as "central norm," as "the center of history," as the "one and 
only" incarnation of God in history has, consciously or unconsciously, 
caused or condoned a long trail of what must be called sinful attitudes or 
actions. The most glaring of such sins are the superiority, intolerance, 
rash judgments that have marked Christians' attitudes toward other 
religions. "The immoral factor in the 'scandal of particularity' today is 
its insistence upon a once-and-for-all Christ in a relativistic world It 
precludes Christianity's ability to affirm that all people have a right to 
their place in the sun... If the incarnation of God in finite humanity 
can occur but once, the religious value of all other human history is nil" 
(Driver: 58, 60). If not nil, certainly inferior. 
Ruether asks theologians like Hans Küng who proclaim that authen-
tic humanity was realized only in Jesus whether they are aware how 
much such a belief feeds the attitude "that all other peoples have an 
inauthentic humanity." For Ruether the most convincing piece of 
evidence for the immorality of traditional normative Christology is 
Christianity's sordid history of anti-Semitism. "Theologically, anti-
Judaism developed as the left hand of Christology. Anti-Judaism was 
the negative side of the Christian affirmation that Jesus was the Christ" 
(1981: 31). Dorothée Soelle can even describe much of Christology as 
"Christofascism" in the way it has disposed or allowed Christians to 
impose themselves upon not only other religions but other cultures and 
political parties which do not march under the banner of the final, 
normative, victorious Christ (Driver: 3). Finally, Driver and Ruether 
would place at least part of the blame for the racism and sexism 
infecting Christian behavior at the doorstep of a Christology which 
holds that the perfection of humanity, the full and normative presence of 
God has been realized only, definitively, in a white male. If the medium 
is the message, the whiteness and maleness of the medium share in the 
normativity of the message (Driver: 20, 143: Ruether, 1981: 45-56). 
Even if only a portion of such charges are accurate, even if a 
normative Christology has only indirectly sanctioned, not caused, such 
unethical conduct, still, these theologians hold, such a Christology must 
be, at the least, highly suspect. So they call for a "paradigm-shift," in 
Christology and in Christian attitudes toward other faiths and ideolog-
ies. Their suggestions for how such a shift might begin reflect proposals 
we have already heard. Driver endorses Ruether's call to move Christ 
from the center of history," where he is "the embodiment of a humanity 
already made perfect in God," to "the lead edge of history," where he 
will serve as "a herald of the future" (40). Driver also reflects the views 
of Panikkar and Pawlikowski when he presents the divinity of Jesus as 
the realization of a given, ontological non-dualism between God and 
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world—a realization, however, that "does not indicate something done 
once and once only for all time" (54-65). 
As already pointed out, an "ethical hermeneutics" colors the method 
of most theologians who are trying to reinterpret the uniqueness of Jesus 
in the light of interreligious dialogue. Such a hermeneutics is especially 
evident among missionary theologians like Duraisamy Amalorpavadas, 
Ignace Puthiadam, Henri Maurier, Eugene Hillman, Burlan Sizemore, 
all of whom have been engaged in the actual praxis of dialogue with 
people of other faiths. They have painfully witnessed how an absolutist 
or normative Christology has fostered the "cultural imperialism" of the 
West, how it has roadblocked dialogue and actually been "one of the 
principal reasons for the disappointing results of missionary work." In 
view of such unethical effects, these scholars, like the liberation theolo-
gians, are calling for a revision of traditional Christology (Geffre: vi).5 
IV 
The theocentric, non-normative understanding of Christ, proposed by 
the theologians we have studied, will be experienced by many Christians 
as a threat to the validity of their faith. Therefore, in exploring the 
possibility of a theocentric approach to Christ, theological caution and 
especially pastoral sensitivity are necessary. The views we have 
described in this study need to be further tested in the forum of 
theological discussion and through exposure to the ongoing faith of 
Christian communities. 
In conclusion, I would like to present, very briefly, some consider-
ations which, if further explored, might help establish the value and 
validity of a theocentric, non-normative understanding of Jesus Christ. 
(1) The various appeals for a different, a non-normative proclama-
tion of Christ, which we have just examined, are not as drastically new 
as they may sound. They are, I suggest, part of an evolution that has 
been going on within Christian consciousness, at least in the mainline 
Catholic and Protestant churches, since the early part of this century— 
an evolution from ecclesiocentrism to Christocentrism and now to 
theocentrism. The evolution from ecclesiocentrism to Christocentrism 
began as different Christian churches started to adapt to the environ-
ment of Christian ecumenism. Christians began to sense that their 
ecclesiology, their narrow understanding of the church, was an obstacle 
to genuine exchange with their fellow Christians. A consensus grew that 
the church cannot be identified with the Kingdom of God, that is, with 
the universal grace of Christ. Jesus Christ, not the church, is the center 
of the salvific universe. Thus, the shift from ecclesiocentrism to Christo-
centrism took shape. 
5This entire volume (Geffre) is an expression of missionary dissatisfaction with 
Christianity's claims for superiority or normativity (see especially Puthiadam). For the 
negative effects which a normative Christology has on missionary efforts: Ganoczy, 
Singleton, Maurier. 
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More recently, as Christian ecumenism among the churches is 
broadening into ecumenical ecumenism among all religions, a new 
awareness has been evolving. Christians are sensing that just as their 
traditional ecclesiology was an impediment to Christian dialogue, so 
their traditional Christology, which insists on the finality and normativ-
ity of Christ, is an obstacle to interreligious dialogue. The new environ-
ment of religious pluralism is forcing Christians to ask whether God is 
revealed definitively in Jesus, whether the incarnational movement of 
Divinity is broader than what happened in Jesus Christ. We are on the 
verge, or in the midst, of this next stage of evolution, from Christocen-
trism to theocentrism. 
(2) Another indication that a theocentric, non-normative Christology 
need not be considered a foreign body within Christian awareness can be 
found in many contemporary, well-established Christologies. I think a 
case can be made that a non-exclusive, non-normative understanding of 
Christ is implicitly contained in the transcendental Christology of Karl 
Rahner and in the process Christologies of John Cobb, Schubert Ogden, 
Norman Pittenger, and David Griffin. Even though both schools make 
use of different starting points and different conceptual frameworks, 
they agree in their efforts to show that the incarnation of God in Jesus 
Christ is not a freak event or an anomaly in human history. Rather, 
divine incarnation in Jesus represents the fulfillment of what God is 
doing in all of history, the fulfillment of what we are as human beings. 
As Rahner puts it, in Jesus human nature "simply arrived at the point to 
which it always strives by virtue of its essence" (1966:109-110,117). In 
Pittenger's words, Jesus is "the One in whom God actualized in a living 
human personality the potential God-man relationship which is the 
divinely-intended truth about every man" (114). 
Anyone who agrees with this understanding of incarnation must 
question whether these theologians are really being consistent when they 
go on to insist that such a total fulfillment of human nature has taken 
place and can take place only in Jesus of Nazareth. It seems that these 
transcendental and process views of Christ, which see the incarnation as 
the perfection of human nature, have established, willy-nilly, the 
possibility, if not the probability, that what happened in Jesus may have 
happened elsewhere. 
(3) A further endorsement for a theocentric Christology comes from 
liberation theologians like Leonardo Boff, Juan Sobrino, and Rosemary 
Ruether. Once again, this endorsement (for Boff and Sobrino) is 
unintended and implicit. For liberation Christology, as for liberation 
theology in general, praxis is the foundation and touchstone of theory. 
This means, according to these theologians, that one can really know 
who Jesus is, one can know the meaning of his titles, only in the concrete 
following of Jesus, only in the practice of the Gospel. Furthermore, 
liberation theologians hold that it is not necessary to have crystal clarity 
and certainty in one's theory or doctrine about Jesus before one commits 
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oneself to living his message. Orthodoxy, in other words, will flow from, 
and constantly have to be reexamined in, orthopraxis. 
If such a liberation method makes sense, it leads to some clear 
implications concerning the uniqueness of Jesus. One can really know 
what such titles as "only begotten Son of God" or "one Mediator" and 
"no other name" really mean, one can know whether they should be 
understood in a Christocentric or theocentric manner, only in the 
concrete praxis of following Jesus. One of the most important forms of 
Christian praxis today, as many churches are admitting, is the task of 
witnessing to Christ in an authentic dialogue with other religions. This 
means that Christians can come to an orthodox understanding of how 
Jesus is unique only in the orthopraxis of dialogue with other faiths. The 
dialogue will provide doctrinal clarity concerning Jesus' uniqueness. 
Such clarity cannot be had beforehand. This should not disturb Chris-
tians. As liberation theologians point out, one does not have to have 
orthodox certainty that Jesus is the "one and only" before one can 
commit oneself to working for the kingdom he announced. It is much 
more important to follow him than to know and insist that there is no one 
else like him. "Anyone who is not against us, is with us" (Mk. 9:40 ). 
(4) Some of the most weighted resistance to a theocentric, non-
normative understanding of Jesus is voiced in the name of the New 
Testament witness. There are, however, elements in the New Testament 
that allow for, perhaps even call for, a revision of Christians' present 
understanding of Jesus' uniqueness. For example, New Testament 
scholars generally agree that there are not one but many Christologies, 
that no one of them was normative, and that all of them took form 
through a critical but open exchange with Jewish and Greek cultural-
religious images. If this is so, is this not a platform and challenge to carry 
on the task of developing new Christologies, which will be faithful to but 
different from the old (as much as John's incarnational Christology 
confirmed yet went beyond the Synoptics' Son of Man Christology)? 
And might not a contemporary theocentric, non-normative Christology 
be considered, possibly, to be a valid new view of Jesus, elaborated as it is 
in a critical but open dialogue with other religions? This is only a 
suggestion which, evidently, needs further exploration. 
This suggestion takes on greater validity in light of a more important 
and more secure ingredient of the New Testament message. One of the 
few issues on which New Testament experts are in full agreement is that 
the focus and core content of Jesus' original message was the Kingdom 
of God. Jesus' mission and person were profoundly kingdom-centered, 
which means theocentric. All his powers were to serve this God and 
kingdom; all else took second place. Even though he saw his own role as 
crucial in bringing about that kingdom, the Father and the kingdom 
remained greater than he. 
The bulk of the New Testanent, of course, represents the process by 
which the proclaimer of the kingdom became the proclaimed. The New 
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Testament is evidently Christocentric. Still, the Christocentrism of the 
New Testment does not lose hold of Jesus' original theocentrism. Even in 
the three texts in which Jesus is proclaimed as God or as divine (Jn. 1:1 ; 
Jn. 20:28; Heb. 1:8-9), an evident subordination is preserved (Brown: 
23-28). Even Paul, in urging his radical Christocentrism, reminds his 
communities that "you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God" (I 
Cor. 3:23). His final vision is "that God may be everything to everyone" 
(I Cor. 15:28). The New Testament maintains a delicate balance 
between Christocentrism and theocentrism. Perhaps the suggestions we 
are making for a new theocentric Christology might regain that 
balance. 
(5) Finally, I believe that an understanding of Jesus that does not 
insist on his finality and normativity would preserve both the content 
and intent of the abundant, apparently exclusive claims that the New 
Testament makes about Jesus ("One Mediator," I Tim. 2:5; "only 
begotten son of God," Jn. 1:14; "once and for all," Heb. 9:12). With 
New Testament scholars like Krister Stendahl (14-15) and Frances 
Young (13), I believe that a case could be made that such expressions 
are mistreated when they are taken as philosophical, dogmatic language 
meant to state definitively what is Jesus' place in the structures of 
reality. Rather, such proclamations are confessional, religious language, 
or, as Stendahl puts it, "love language." Those who spoke such language 
were not trying to articulate unchangeable metaphysical dogmas about 
Jesus; they were attempting, rather, to voice what Jesus had done for 
them, what it meant to be among his followers, what he might mean for 
others who would commit themselves to him. Christians mistreat such 
language, therefore, when they use it as a means to reject or belittle 
others. "No other name" is primarily a confession of Jesus, not a 
negation of others. 
A non-normative, theocentric Christology, therefore, will be, in the 
words and advice of H. Richard Niebuhr (39-41), a confessional 
Christology. It will be both a certain and an open-ended confession of 
Jesus Christ. It will enable Christians to take a firm position; but it will 
also require them to be open to and possibly learn from other positions. It 
will allow them to affirm the uniqueness and the universal significance 
of what God has done in Jesus; but at the same time it will require them 
to recognize and be challenged by the uniqueness and universal signifi-
cance of what the Divine Mystery may have revealed through others. In 
boldly proclaiming that God has indeed been defined in Jesus, Chris-
tians will also humbly admit that God has not been confined to Jesus. 
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